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On Fed Watching and
Central Bank Transparency∗
Joseph H. Haslag
Abstract: In this paper, I examine central bank transparency in two diﬀerent
general equilibrium settings. A transparent central bank eliminates any uncertainty
about future money growth. Agents can expend resources to process messages about
future money growth, which is labelled fed watching. So transparency is equivalent
to a case in which a private agent processes all of the central banks messages and
correctly infers what the future money growth rate will be. In both settings, conditions
are derived in which a proper subset of messages are processed. In one setting, this
outcome reßects the central banks eﬀorts to be secretive. In the other, the central
bank is opaque because the absence of transparency is the key to letting a benevolent
central bank follow a state-contingent rule.
∗I have beneÞtted from conversations with Joydeep Bhattacharya, Michelle GarÞnkel, Gerhard
Glomm, Greg Huﬀman, Pete Klenow, Evan Koenig, Jack Meyer, Rowena Pechenino, Chris Waller,
Carlos Zarazaga, seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Michigan State Uni-
versity, Notre Dame University, Texas A&M University and, especially, Scott Freeman. None can
be held accountable for remaining errors.
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Consider the legions of economists whose sole function it is to interpret
U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspans every twist and turn
of phrase so as to divine which way the monetary winds are blowing.
Caroline A. Baum, The Last Word p.64
1 Introduction
The quote serves as an insightful, albeit casual, piece of empiricism. Two important
Þndings are stressed. One is that resources are expended trying to infer what
monetary policy action will be taken. The other is that the central bank makes
statements that might yield some insight into its future plans, but the messages are
not typically transparent.
Why are central banks not totally transparent about their future actions? Good-
friend (1986) laid out the case for transparency, arguing point-by-point against the
Federal Reserves case for withholding the FOMCs deliberations. Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), Dotsey (1987), and Tabellini (1987) develop models in which the
costs of central-bank secrecy are identiÞed. In this literature, agents must forecast
interest rates and the objective is to maximize forecast-error accuracy. Secrecy,
therefore, raises the costs because forecasts are less accurate. Rudin (1988) extends
this literature to consider a case in which some agents can learn about future actions
by fed watching.1 In Rudins model the quantity of fed watching is exogenously
determined. Depending on the fraction of agents who fed watch, Rudin considers
a case in which the central bank is less secretive, showing that the non-fed watchers
may become less accurate forecasters.2
1Balke and Haslag (1991, 1992) also study models in which agents can expend resources to
mitigate uncertainty.
2Note further that in Rudins setup, fed watching lets informed agents know the money supply
shock. Hence, if each agent was a fed watcher, there would be no central bank secrecy. Cosimano
and Van Huyck (1993) investigate a case in which banks try to extract noisy signals from the FOMCs
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Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) develop notions of central bank transparency.3
They derive conditions in which a central bankers uses imperfect monetary control
to mask their intentions. In other words, Cukierman and Meltzers central bank
combine the absence of transparency with control errors to meet its objective at the
lowest possible reputation cost. More recently, Faust and Svensson (1999) extend
the Cukierman-Meltzer setup, distinguishing between transparency and control error.
In doing so, the central bank chooses the pair that maximizes its objective function.
They Þnd that central banks would choose to be opaque.
The purpose of this paper is account for both fed watching and central bank
transparency. It is related to the earlier literature in the sense that I am interested
in deriving conditions in which the central bank will not be transparent. There are
two modiÞcations. First, I examine these activities in a simple general equilibrium
model. An obvious advantage to this approach is that it is straightforward to do
welfare analysis. Indeed, welfare is the basis for comparing diﬀerent polices. Second,
transparency is characterized how costly it is for private agents to draw inference
about future central bank actions from the central bank speeches. Cukierman and
Meltzer permit the central bank to make a single announcement. Faust and Svensson
characterize transparency in terms of the quality of the announcement. Eﬀectively,
the announcement is higher quality when the distribution around that announcement
has a lower variance. Because the central bank makes a sequence of statements
regarding it intentions about monetary policy, transparency corresponds roughly to
what it costs to make sense out of the central bank statements.
Communication plays a big role in this setup. More speciÞcally, I am interested in
the communication between the central bank and agents. Communication, however,
only becomes valuable to the agent when it is processed. So, the central banks state-
policy directive. In their setup, the directive is deemed secretive because it is released after the
directive is no longer relevant.
3Their model builds on the policy-game models developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) for
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ments are distributed freely, but it is costly to people to translate these statements
into something useable about the central banks future actions. Here, communica-
tions are continuous with the unit of measurement labeled a message. There are
a Þnite number of messages that constitute the central banks communication and
transparency exists when private agents process all of the messages. Agents must
expend resourcesfed watchto process these messages, which means that they forego
consumption. By processing all the messages, the central bank is transparent, which
corresponds to a case in which there is no uncertainty about future money growth
rates.4
In this economy, money is nonneutral. Each period, N agents are born and their
preferences are identical. The agent is Þnite lived and holds Þat money to satisfy
a portfolio restriction. Because of the reserve requirement, the gross real return to
saving depends on the realized money growth rate. In a setup in which the agent
lives two periods, all the risk arises in old age because the gross real return to Þat
money is unknown at the time the agent must make the consumption-saving decision.
Agents have concave utility functions, explaining why uncertain future money growth
matters to ones expected lifetime welfare.5
In addition to the consumption-saving decision, the agent decides how to allo-
cate resources between consumption when young and fed watching. Obviously, fed
watching means that the agent foregoes some consumption. The marginal gain to
the agent comes in the form of transforming the distribution of future money growth
rates. In other words, I assume there exists a technology such that fed watching
is transformed such that the agents expected utility is greater. In short, the agent
prefers the distribution with greater fed watching than the one without. The question
then is whether it is worth it to fed watch.
4Here, I use the term transparency analogously to the notion of a fully revealing equilibrium
positied by Milgrom (1981).
5Sandmo (1970) looks at the eﬀect of uncertainty on consumption-saving decisions in partial
equilibrium.
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Fed watching consists of acquiring elements from the set of central-bank messages.
The costs arise because the agent expends resources to process each message. So, I
assume there is a nonnegative fee, which is the same for each message processed, that
is interpreted as the quantity of consumption good used to transform the message
into a change in the distribution function. For instance, if the agent were to process
all the messages at date t, the processing technology yields a degenerate distribution
with probability mass centered on the realized date t + 1 money growth rate. One
can interpret the fee as being a measure of how opaque the central banks messages
are.
In this paper, I derive two sets of conditions. First, under what conditions will
agent choose to pay some positive processing fee? Once these conditions are obtained,
it is straightforward to show the welfare costs associated with an opaque central bank.
In addition to establishing conditions in which fed watching occurs in equilibrium,
central-bank transparency represents a benchmark for other welfare comparisons.
Second, under what conditions would a central bank wish to be opaque? I
oﬀer two possible explanation for why a central bank might choose opaqueness. One
emphasizes the role of diﬀerential objective functions. For instance, the notion that a
central bank maximizes a social objective function that diﬀers from the private agents
can account for an equilibrium is which the central bank is opaque. The other
explanation, however, emphasizes the ßexibility that opaqueness oﬀers the central
bank. Indeed, I study models in which it is natural to interpret opaqueness as being
consistent with interest-rate targeting and transparency is consistent with money
growth targeting. As such, opaqueness permits the central bank to respond to
external shocks that actually result in welfare gains.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The economic environ-
ment is described in Section 2 along with the deÞnition and characterization of the
rational-expectations equilibrium. Section 3 presents a more concrete example of fed
watching and the transformation to the distribution function depicting future money
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growth. Section 4 presents two propositions pertaining to the eﬀect that changes in
the processing fee have on the agents welfare and on economic activity. In Section
5, the environment is modiÞed to allow the central bank to choose the processing
fee. Section 6 examines the central banks decision regarding the processing fee in
an environment with uncertain returns to capital. A brief discussion of the results
is oﬀered in Section 7.
2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
The model is a modiÞed version of Cass and Yaaris (1966) overlapping generations
economy. Time is indexed by t = 1, 2, ... In each period, N two-period lived agents
are born. An agent born at date t maximizes the expected value of lifetime utility,
W¯ = U(c1t)+ E V (c2t+1), where ci denotes the units of the consumption in agents
ith period of life. The functions, U, V are thrice-continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
concave and strictly increasing in units of the consumption good with limc1→0 U
0(.),
and limc2→0 V
0 (.) =∞.
Each agent born at date t ≥ 1 is endowed with one unit of productive time when
young and nothing when old. The unit of time is supplied inelastically to the market,
producing y units of the consumption good. The consumption good spoils at the
end of the period. At date t = 1, there are N agents who live for only one period.
Referred to as the initial old, these agents do not have productive time. The utility
of the initial old is represented by V (c21).
Because the agent values consumption when young and when old, the problem is to
use Þrst-period income to Þnance second-period consumption. In this economy, there
are three assets. One is capital. Consumption goods can be costlessly transformed
into capital. Capital goods acquired at date t are transformed into units of the
consumption good at date t + 1 according to the function, f(kt). The function
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has the following properties: f 0(.) > 0, f 00(.) < 0, f(0) = 0, limk→0 f 0(.) = ∞, and
limk→∞ f 0(.) = 0. All capital is completely depreciated by production process. The
second asset is government bonds. A young agent can purchase bt dollars worth
of government bonds at date t, receiving Rt+1bt dollars at date t + 1, with R > 1.
Let vt denote the quantity of the consumption good that is traded for one dollar.
Thus, a young agent trades vtbt units of the consumption good when young, receiving
vt+1Rt+1bt units of the consumption good when old. The third asset is Þat money.
A young agent trades units of the consumption good for vtmt worth of Þat money at
date t. One period later, the agent can purchase vt+1mt units of the consumption
good. It follows that st = kt + vtbt + vtmt.
Fiat money does not pay interest and government bonds do. Let v denote the
value of Þat money (the number of goods that can be acquired with one unit of
money). Because money is rate-of-return dominated, v will be greater than zero
if and only if there is some reason for the agent to hold it. Following Bryant and
Wallace (1980), I apply a legal restriction, assuming that some fraction of a young
agents saving must be in the form of Þat money. Formally, let vtmt = λst. In
addition, to pin down the distribution of the agents savings, I assume vtbt = δst.6
Here, 0 ≤ λ, δ ≤ 1 and λ+δ ≤ 1. Because government paperbonds and Þat money
cannot exceed the quantity of the agents savings, there is an implicit nonnegativity
constraint on the capital stock.
Each member of the initial-old generation is endowed with s0 units of the con-
sumption goods. The initial olds savings consist of capital, k0, government bonds
and Þat money equal to b0 and m0 dollars; in short, s0 = k0 + v1b0 + v1m0. The
utility of the initial old is strictly increasing in the quantity of the consumption good.
6Here, δ can be interpreted as a secondary reserve requirement. In this case, an agent will hold
some government bonds even though it may be rate of return dominated by capital. Alternatively,
suppose the the gross real return on capital and the risk-adjusted gross real return to government
bonds are equal. In this interpretation, δ pins down the bond-saving ratio, thus making the agents
portfolio allocation determinate.
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The stock of money evolves according to the rule, mt = θtmt−1.7
In this economy, uncertainty arises because agents cannot perfectly forecast the
growth rate of the money stock. Money growth, denoted θ, can change from period
to period; indeed, it is represented as a stochastic process. I assume the process is
independently and identically distributed, though including a moving -average term
would not materially alter the results in this paper. Money is created and distributed
as lump-sum transfer payment to agents when old; that is, at = (θt−1)vtmt−1 dollars
are transferred to members of the generations born at date t − 1. Members of the
young generation do not know the realization of θ until date t. The implication is that
young agents do not know the realization of the governments lump-sum transfer and
consequently do not know the gross real return to saving when they must make their
consumption-saving decision. Thus, uncertainty about the future money growth rate
is equivalent to uncertainty about the quantity of second-period resources.
In this paper, the government has three distinct functions: paying its debt, making
lump-sum transfer payments, and generating messages. Debt obligations are met by
either issuing new debt or through lump-sum tax receipts. The government uses
seigniorage to Þnance its transfer payments.8
I assume there are a Þnite number (T <∞) of messages and that the mes-
sages are ordered and standardized in the sense that each messages marginal im-
pact on the agents information set is the same and independent of the message.9
Messages are divisible so that agents can acquire partial messages. Let Φ (t) =
{φ1 (t) ,φ2 (t) , ...,φT (t)} denote a set of messages that are available. Suppose an
agent wishes to acquire date-t messages. It is costless to acquire a message. Costs
7Note that I specify the growth rate in per-young-person terms. This is equivalent to specifying
things in aggregate terms because the population is constant. Letting population grow according
to a Þxed rule would not materially change the conclusions drawn in this paper.
8See Champ and Freeman (1990) for a description of a government in which there are dedicated
government budget constraints. Here, dedicated refers to the speciÞcation that certain revenues are
dedicated to speciÞc types of government expenditures.
9See Allen (1989) for description of an economy in which there is costly, diﬀerentiated information.
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are incurred when the agent processes a message and I assume the messages must be
processed sequentially.10 In processing a message, the agent modiÞes the distribution
of future outcomes. I assume, for simplicity, that each message has a positive mar-
ginal product. In other words, a processed message results in a distribution function
that is no less preferred to a distribution in which a fewer number of messages are
processed. As the reader will see, this is a necessary, but not suﬃcient assumption to
guarantee that an interior quantity of fed watching. I assume that the agent knows
the processing technology. So, the agent acquires the message and can determine
whether it is worth expending the eﬀort to transform the message into a change in
the distribution or not. Clearly, this not imply that the agent will process all of the
messages.
The premise here is that fed watching is costly. Hence, I need to describe the
processing costs, measured in units of the consumption good, to the watcher. I
assume that there is a processing fee such that it takes ρ goods to convert a message
into a change in the agents distribution function. The government does not receive
anything from the acquisition of these messages. Thus, the total amount spent on
government messages is the product ρωt where ωt is the cardinal number of the set
of processed messages. A convenient way to think of ω is as follows: suppose that
the agent processes messages equal to the set, At = {φ1 (t) ,φ2 (t) , ...,φ² (t)}, where
² ≤ T . Then ω = ²
T
. In words, ω is the fraction of the set of messages processed by
the agent. As the number of messages processed increases, ω, be deÞnition, increases.
For now, I assume that ρ is determined by nature. I will relax this assumption in
later sections of the paper.
Formally, the governments budget constraints are represented as
10I am attempting to draw a distinction between acquisition and processing that is akin to the
diﬀerence between reading words and comprehending them. Comprehension takes relatively greater
eﬀort.
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Rtvtbt−1 = vtbt + τ t (1)
vt (mt −mt−1) = at (2)
The agents problem adds fed watching to the usual consumption-saving decision.
I assume that the non-fed watching agent maximizes expected utility conditioned on
the information set denoted by Ω0, where Ω0 is the information set that is taken as
given by the young agent. Note that the information set is stationary over time. By
acquiring messages, the agents information set is represented by Ωt = Ω0∪ At.
What is the payoﬀ to fed watching?. I introduce a technology such that an
additional message transforms the conditional distribution function. Let G(θt+1|Ω0)
denote the distribution function for the money growth rate conditional on an agent
abstaining from fed watching. The distribution function is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, with the Þrst derivative yielding a density function, denoted g(θt+1|Ω0).
The random variable, θ, has nonnegative supports. With θ = 0, Þat money is com-
pletely removed from the economy. In contrast, with θ = ∞, the quantity of Þat
money is inÞnitely large, so that with Þnite savings, the value of Þat money is zero
in equilibrium . In other words, the supports of the distribution function correspond
to non-monetary economies.
Thus, the youngs budget constraint is represented by
y ≥ c1t + st + ρtωt (3)
and that of the old agents is represented as
rt+1st + at+1 − τ ≥ c2t+1 (4)
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2.2 Equilibrium
DeÞne a rational expectations competitive equilibrium for this model economy con-
sists of a sequence of functions for agents allocations{c1t} , {c2t} (or {dt}), and
{Ωt}prices, {ρt} and {rt} and policy settings {τ t} , {θt} , {bt} , and {λt} such that
(i) agents choose consumption and deposits, taking prices and policy variables
as given, to maximize lifetime utility;
(ii) agents choose{Ωt}which pins down the conditional probability density
function of money growth rates that solves their maximization problem and corre-
sponds to the objective distribution function;
(iii) markets clear and the government budget constraints [equations 1-2] are
satisÞed.
The maximization problem for the agent born at date t can be expressed as the
choice of deposits and messages to maximize W¯ subject to equations (3) and (4).
Together, the government budget constraints and the market clearing conditions
vtbt = δst, vtmt = γstindicate that, in equilibrium, agents choose a quantity of
government bonds and Þat money that is equal to the amount oﬀered by the govern-
ment.
What is diﬀerent in this paper is the buying and selling of messages about next
periods money growth rate. The intuition is straightforward. For instance, consider
a stationary equilibrium for this economy. The money market clearing condition
implies that the ex post real return to Þat money is equal to the inverse of the money
growth rate. By construction, the gross real return to savings is inversely related
to the monetary growth rate. Agents potentially want to buy messages because it
reduces uncertainty about the money growth rate.
Consider the program for an agent that maximizes lifetime welfare. More pre-
cisely, using the agents budget constraints, the objective is to choose the level of
saving that maximizes expected lifetime utility. The agents program is,
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max
st,ωt
W¯ = U (y − st − ρtωt) + EV (rt+1st + at+1 − τ ) (P1)
For now, it is suﬃcient to note that the agents uncertainty is with respect to the
resources available for second-period income. More speciÞcally, the gross real return
to savings is a function money growth rate. Each unit of Þat money acquired at date
t, costing vt units of the consumption good, is worth vt+1 units of the consumption
good at date t+1. Hence, the gross real return to Þat money is vt+1
vt
. In a stationary
setting, the money market clearing condition implies that vt+1
vt
= 1
θt+1
. In addition, it
is clear from the government budget constraint that the size of the lump-sum transfer
payment is also a function of the money growth rate. The bottom line is that both
the gross real return, r, and the lump-sum transfer payment, a, are random variables
inßuenced by the random variable, θ. I denote the relationships as: rt+1 = r (θt+1)
and at+1 = a (θt+1). Thus, the expected second-period utility is written as
EV (rt+1st + at+1 − τ) =
Z ∞
0
V [r (θt+1) st + a (θt+1)− τ ] g (θt+1|Ωt) dθ
With this expression, it is straightforward to see that changes in the quantity
of goods used to acquire messages aﬀect the agents second-period utility through a
transformation to the density function.
To make the agents optimizing conditions explicit, the Þrst-order conditions for
this program are
−U 0 (.) +
Z ∞
0
V 0 [.] r (.) g (.) dθ = 0 (5)
and
−ρtU 0 +
Z ∞
0
V [.] g0 (θt+1|dΩt) dθ = 0 (6)
where g0 (.) denotes the transformed probability density function. In words, g0 (.)
characterizes the probability that a particular value of θ is realized when the agent
acquires a slightly larger quantity of information.
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Equation 5 is the standard Euler equation; an agent chooses the level of saving
at which the marginal utility lost by foregoing a little more Þrst-period consumption
is equal to the expected marginal utility gained by saving it, receiving an expected
gross real return equal to r and consuming it in the second period of life.
Equation 6 is diﬀerent. The expression says that messages are acquired up to the
point at which the agent is indiﬀerent between it and the marginal utility associated
with foregoing consumption when young. Equation (6) restricts our attention to
a class of transformations to the conditional probability density function such that
expected utility is higher with more messages.11 In particular, we are looking only
at messages that are productive in the sense that expected utility is raised. Be-
cause messages are standardized, I exclude messages that would result in greater
uncertainty. Thus, the class of transformations correspond to those in which these
messages yield positive marginal value. Otherwise, we are limited to a corner solu-
tion in which there is no fed watching. To satisfy the second-order conditions, note
that marginal product of each additional message is diminishing.
Though the economics is fairly straightforward, it is probably useful to make the
transformation to expected utility a bit more clear. Suppose there are two distribu-
tions corresponding to diﬀerent levels of fed watching. Let Ω0 + dA represent a case
in which (an inÞnitesimally small) quantity of messages is acquired.12 Accordingly,
the two density functions are g (θt+1|Ω0 + dA) and g (θt+1|Ω0), respectively. Thus,
the change in expected utility isZ ∞
0
V [.] g (θt+1|Ω0 + dA) dθ −
Z ∞
0
V [.] g (θt+1|Ω0) dθ
Hence, expected utility is computed under two diﬀerent density functions. To
ensure that this expression is positive, I focus on members of the class of information-
11See Bertocchi and Wang (1996) for a model economy in which agents consumption-saving
decision is explicit. In their setup, agents costlessly learns about the technological parameters.
12More precisely, the information set Ω0 ⊂ Ω0 + dA, where dA denotes a marginal change in the
quantity of messages processed. Note that ω is increasing with the number of messages processed.
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processing technologies characterized by distributions in which a distribution with
more intense fed watching (larger ω) stochastically dominates distributions with less
intense fed watching (smaller ω). Formally, the distribution functionG (θt+1|Ω0 + dA)
stochastically dominates the distribution function G (Ω0) for dA > 0.13
In this paper, I focus on stationary equilibrium. In particular, the key property
is st = st+1 ∀t ≥ 1.14 The gross real return to saving is
rt+1 = (1− δ − λ) f 0(.) + δRt+1
θt+1
+ λ
1
θt+1
. (7)
Equation 7 indicates that the gross real return to savings is a weighted sum of the
three asset returns: capital, government bonds, and Þat money. The weights are the
assets shares.
In the next section, I consider a particular member of the class of information-
processing technologies. I focus on a case in which the expected rate of money growth
is invariant to the level of fed watching. This imposes restrictions on the form of
stochastic dominance. SpeciÞcally, the distributionG (Ω+ dA) exhibits second-order
stochastic dominance in relation to the distribution G (Ω). For this case, it is possible
that the mean value is constant. For the special case in which the mean value of
the distribution G (Ω+ dA) is equal to the mean value of the distribution G (Ω),
then G (Ω+ dA) is a mean-preserving contraction of G (Ω). We will investigate this
particular case in more detail in the following section.
3 Gains from fed watching: a concrete example
To make the information payoﬀ more concrete, suppose that a representative young
agent pays for a message. Further, let money growth rates have Þnite, nonnegative
supports; that is, 0 ≤ θ∗ < θ∗ The eﬀect of a change in fed watching is captured as
13See Hadar and Russell (1969) for a proof of this result.
14For the sake of completeness, the properties of a stationary equilibrium include c1t = c1t+1,
c2t = c2t+1, kt = kt+1, vtbt = vt+1bt+1, and vtmt = vt+1mt+1.
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a transformation of the random variable, θ. Let θ0 = w0 + w1θ, where w0 = qθ¯ and
w1 = 1− q and 0 < q < 1.15 Here, θ¯ denotes the mean, or expected money growth
rate for the density function g(θ|Ω). Note that this linear aﬃne transformation of the
random variable yields a mean-preserving contraction of conditional density function,
or alternatively, θ0 dominates θ in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance
(hereafter, SSD).
In this setting, q is a weight. As q increases, the eﬀect is equivalent to putting less
weight on the values in the tails and more on the mean value. One way to capture the
eﬀect of fed watching is let the weight depend on the quantity of messages acquired
by the agent. In other words, let qt = h(Ωt). The h(.) function has the following
properties: h(0) = 0, h [Φ (t)] = 1, h0(.) > 0, h00(.) < 0. These properties have the
following economic interpretation. If no messages are acquired by private agents,
q = 0 and the conditional density function for θ0 is the same as the conditional
density function for θ. If, however, the agent acquires all the messages available,
the density function of θ degenerates and the agent knows, with certainty, what next
periods money growth rate is. With h0(.) > 0, the payoﬀ to acquiring messages is
that the conditional distribution for θ0 SSD θ. By focusing on a mean-preserving
contraction, the idea is that the agents money-growth-rate forecast is unbiased, with
or without message acquisition. Finally, h00(.) < 0, asserts that the marginal payoﬀ
to message acquisition to the agent is diminishing in Ω.
Now, the link between fed watching and the transformation of the random variable
15Alternatively, one can think of the transformation as going the other way; that is,
θ = θ0 + α(θ0 − θ¯0)
where θ¯
0
dentoes the mean of the distribution function of θ0 and α > 0. A mean-preserving
spread, therefore, requires that θ¯0 = θ¯. Rewrite this expression, solving for θ0, obtaining
θ0 =
1
1+ α
θ +
α
1+ α
θ¯
0
.
In the text, I have substituted q = α1+α .
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is complete. Use h(.) to substitute for qt, obtaining θ
0 = h(Ωt)θ¯+[1− h(Ωt)] θ. It is
straightforward to show that θ = θ
0−h(Ωt)θ¯
1−h(Ωt) . This transformation means that expected
utility for an agent in the second-period of life can be equivalently characterized as
either
EV (.) =
Z ∞
0
V [r (θ) s+ a (θ)− τ ] g (θ|Ω) dθ
or, more generally
EV (.) =
Z ∞
h(Ωt)θ¯
V [r (θ) s+ a (θ)− τ ] g
Ã
θ
0 − h(Ωt)θ¯
1− h(Ωt)
!
dθ
0
So, the change in expected second-period utility is
−V ©r £h (Ω) θ¯¤ s+ a £h (Ω) θ¯¤− τªh0 (.) θ¯ + Z ∞
h(Ωt)θ¯
V (.)g0 (.)
(
h0 (.)
¡
θ0 − θ¯¢
[1− h (.)]2
)
dθ
0
(8)
By, construction, equation (8) is positive. The concrete example adds some
additional structure to the general form above. In particular, there is a particular
description about how fed watching transforms the random variable. This feature
is subsumed in the modiÞed density function embodied in g0 (θ|Ω) in equation (6).
The example depicts the role played by stochastic dominance, but also adds a role
for learning. As equation (8) shows, the density function is transformed by a small
increase in fed watching. In addition, changes in q captures the change in the
probability weight given to each possible money growth rate. As such, it seems
natural to refer to the rate of change in the weighting scheme, h0(.), as learning.
Both learning and stochastic dominance are then incorporated into the calculation of
second-period utility to the agents preferences for second-period consumption.
For this particular case, there is still the question about whether Ω > 0 in equi-
librium. The Þrst-order condition is
ρU 0 (y − s− ρΩ) = z1 +z2 (9)
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where
z1 ≡ −V
©
r
£
h (Ω) θ¯
¤
s+ a
£
h (Ω) θ¯
¤− τªh0 (.) θ¯
and
z2 ≡
Z ∞
h(Ωt)θ¯
V
©
r
£
h (Ω) θ¯
¤
s+ a
£
h (Ω) θ¯
¤− τª g0 (θ0)(h0 (Ω) ¡θ0 − θ¯¢
[1− h (Ω)]2
)
dθ
0
The shut-down conditionthe condition in which agents would not acquire any
costly information about the fedrequires that the marginal utility of Þrst-period
consumption is greater than the marginal increase in expected utility evaluated at
Ω = 0. Thus, for agent to do some fed watching, the following fed-watching condition
must hold:
U 0 (y − s) < −V [r (0) s+ a (0)]−τ+
Z ∞
0
V [r (0) + a (0)− τ ] g (θ|0) h0 (0) ¡θ0 − θ¯¢ dθ0
(10)
Thus, equation (10) states what condition must be satisÞed for an interior solution
for fed watching. We will also be interested in the other corner solution; that is, the
one in which all messages are acquired.
4 Secrecy, welfare and economic activity
In this section, I consider the eﬀects that changes in the processing fee, ρ, have on the
agents welfare and on the level of saving. Because the agent takes the processing
fee as given, these results carry over to a more general setting in which the central
bank sets the value of the processing fee. I begin by focusing on the intensity of fed
watching.
The Þrst Þnding examines the impact that a positive processing fee has on the
agents welfare. The following proposition characterizes the welfare consequences.
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Proposition 1 An increase in the processing fee of government messages, ρ, reduces
lifetime expected utility of all generations born at date t > 1.
Proof: For the case in which the agents acquire some positive quantity of central
bank messages, the eﬀect on lifetime utility is
−ωU 0 (.)
The expression is clearly negative. Thus, agents are worse oﬀ when there is an
increase in the processing fee.¥
The intuition for Proposition 1 is straightforward. An increase in the processing
fee, for instance, means that the agent must forego a larger quantity of Þrst-period
consumption to acquire the same number of messages. From equation 6, the product
of the processing fee and the marginal utility of consumption when young increases
when ρ increases. With U (.) concave, the product is reduced by consuming more
when young, crowding out saving and reducing the amount of fed watching. At a
very basic level, Proposition 1 distinguishes between an agents welfare in a perfect
foresight economy and the agents welfare in an uncertain environment. With concave
utility functions, the agent is better oﬀ when there is no uncertainty about future
money growth. This holds when the price of messages is zero.
Remark 1 Proposition 1 is not terribly surprising. Indeed, the upshot is that young
agent’s would prefer less costly information than more costly. In the limit, as ρ→ 0,
the agent’s consumption of messages would approach full information, and the con-
ditional distribution would degenerate. Hence, as the processing fee approaches zero,
the outcome looks exactly like it would in a perfect information setting. Because,
I assume that nature chooses the processing fee, the issue of what a benevolent pol-
icymaker woiuld choose is moot. It is obvious from Propositon 1 that a benevolent
policymaker has nothing to gain from keeping anything from the agent.
Another question is, What eﬀect does a change in the processing fee have on the
equilibrium capital stock? Together, the Þrst-order conditions can be used to derive
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functions for savings and fed watching as functions of the processing fee; that is, s (ρ)
and ω (ρ).
Two additional assumptions are required regarding the agents preferences.
Assumption 1: Agent’s preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk
aversion.
Assumption 2: Total spending on fed watching is a decreasing function
of the price of messages.
Proposition 2 An increase in the processing fee for messages results in more saving,
and thus, a larger capital stock.
Proof: Substitute the functionss (ρ) and ω (ρ)into the Þrst-order conditions
(equations (5) and (6)). Diﬀerentiate with respect to ρ. Note that the resulting
expression from the Euler equation is
U 00 (.) s0 (.) + U 00 (.) [ω (.) + ρω0 (.)] + EV 00 (.) [r (.)]2 s0 (.) + dEV 0 (.) r (.) = 0
With decreasing absolute risk aversion, the last term on the left-hand side is
positive. Assumption 2 implies that the second term is positive.16 Thus, the Þrst
and third term must be negative. Because U 00 and V 00 are both negative, s0 (.) > 0
must hold. Because the capital stock is a linear function of the quantity of saving,
it follows that a larger capital stock accompanies an increase in the processing fee of
the central banks messages¥
What proposition 2 highlights is the role of uncertainty on the agents saving.
Indeed, the eﬀect on saving owes directly to the agents preferences regarding risks to
second-period consumption combined with the assumption that a higher processing
fee reduces the amount of fed watching. In this model economy, therefore, when
16An elastic demand for messages is a stronger assumption than one needs. Elastic demand
guarentees that the agents goods available for Þrst-period consumption and saving increase in the
face of rising message prices. Moreover, DARA then dictates the breakdown between consumption
and saving the face of greater uncertainty.
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the processing fee increases, for instance, the agents equilibrium decision rule is to
increase the quantity of capital.
Remark 2 Because only second-period consumption is at risk, the agent responds to
greater risk—processes fewer messages regarding next period’s money growth rate—by
saving more. In the case of a higher processing fee, the outcome is qualitatively
the same as that resulting an unexpected, positive money supply shock in the sense
that output increases in both cases. According to the theory underlying the Lucas-
supply function, however, the mechanism requires the agents are fooled into producing
more output. In this setup, an increase in the processing fee means that agents face
a riskier distribution. To insure against these risks to second-period consumption,
the agent saves more when young, so that more capital is accumulated, and output
correspondingly rises when the same agaents reach old age.
5 Secrecy: An equilibrium with imperfect infor-
mation
In this section, I consider an economy in which the central bank chooses the processing
fee. Because the central bank knows its money growth rate, the outcome with a
positive processing fee can be interpreted as secrecy. In other words, as long as
the agent does not fed watch enough to acquire all the messages, the central bank
will know its future plans while agents will have a distribution characterizing future
outcomes. Indeed, the positive processing fee goes toward ensuring that the central
bank knows future money growth while the private agent faces a distribution of
possible future money growth rates. Here, secrecy is present whenever the central
banks distribution of future money growth rates is diﬀerent than that faced by private
agents when making consumption allocations. Hence, secrecy is endogenized.
Proposition 1 says that if the central bank seeks to maximize the agents welfare,
the processing fee would be set equal to zero. In this section, I derive conditions
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in which the central bank would choose a positive value for the processing fee. In
this model economy, the positive processing fee is the outcome of noncooperative
behavior.
I begin with a case in which the central bank does not have the same objective
function as the private agent. In this model economy, central bank combines it
knowledge of date-t + 1 money growth and setting the processing fee to satisfy its
objective. In short, the central bank is active in deciding what combination ρ and
θt+1 will satisfy its goals. The presence of this asymmetric information means that
purchasing information is part of a game between the central bank and the agent.
As such, the equilibrium concept will be modiÞed.
The governments social objective function consists of two parts: (i) seigniorage
target and a (ii) capital stock target for the central bank.17 The seigniorage target
and the capital target are assumed to be consistent with the governments social
objective function.
Note that if the central bank receives only one target, the agent could infer the
future money growth rate from the value of the processing fee. So, the private
information game is structured as a sequential game; more speciÞcally, events occur
in the following sequence. At the beginning of date t, agents receive their endowment.
Simultaneously, date-t money growth is realized. Next, the central bank is informed
about its target seigniorage level, denoted a∗ and its target capital stock, denoted
k∗.18 The monetary authority chooses a combination of the processing fee and the
date t+1 money growth rate that satisfy its objective function. Both the target level
of seigniorage and the target capital stock are private information. Lastly, young
17The capital stock target can be thought of as socially desirable stock of capital. Given that a
reserve requirement is present, Helpman and Sadka (1979) derive conditions in which a government
would want to raise revenue from the inßation tax. The seigniorage target is consistent with the
Helpman-Sadka analysis.
18I assume that nature draws a∗ and k∗ such that future money growth is consistent with the
conditional distribution function.
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agents make their allocations, given the value of the processing fee of messages.
For the central bank, note that seigniorage is simply vt (mt −mt−1). The central
bank knows the agents saving function, s (ρ), taking it as given Next, substitute
the money market clearing condition into the expression for seigniorage, writing the
result as
λs (ρt)
µ
1− 1
θt+1
¶
(11)
In equation (11), the central bank has two instruments, the processing fee and the
money growth rate. It is obvious from equation (11) that for a given processing fee,
there is a money growth rate that yields the target seigniorage level. If the central
bank only cared about meeting its seigniorage goal, there are many combinations
of ρt and θt+1 that would satisfy the seigniorage target. Alternatively, with only a
seigniorage target, once the processing fee is announced, the agent could infer what
next periods money growth rate would be.
To resolve the indeterminacy, let the central banks objective function be common
knowledge, consisting of both deviations from the target level of the capital stock,
denoted k∗and the costs of inßation. As with the target level of seigniorage, the
target level of the capital stock is private information. Since the capital stock is a
linear function of the level of the agents saving, it is possible to relate the processing
fee to the capital stock. Thus, let the central banks objective function be
min (kt − k∗) + (θt+1)2 (12)
Equation (12) is a slightly modiÞed version of the objective function used in the
policy game literature developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983a,b). Here k is taking the place of output as the measure of economic
activity. The central banks objective is to minimize costs, which are comprised of
two parts: the Þrst is deviations from the target level of the capital stock and the
other is the inßation rate. I assume that k∗ is drawn such that s (ρ∗) holds for ρ ≥ 0.
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After substituting s (ρ) for the capital stock and using equation (11) for the future
money growth rate the central banks objective function can be rewritten as
min
ρt
(
(1− λ− δ) (s (ρt)− s (ρ∗)) +
·
1− a
∗
λs (ρt)
¸−2)
(13)
As such, the central banks problem yields a solution for the processing fee of
messages while the agent (subsequently) determines the utility maximizing allocation
set, taking the processing fee as given. Here, the equilibrium concept is subgame
perfect. The strategy combination, denoted σ∗, is made of the central banks decision,©
ρ¯t, θ¯t+1
ª
, and the agents allocation, {c¯1t, s¯t}, where the agents allocation maximizes
lifetime utility. Note that strategy combination is subgame perfect if the use of σ∗
results in equilibrium play by each participant. In this simple sequential game,
σ∗ =
©
ρ¯t, θ¯t+1, c¯1t, s¯t
ª
is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Consider a stationary version of this game. (For this stationary setting, I drop
the time subscripts.) A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the solution to the
central banks minimization program is
(1− λ− δ)
2
s0 (.)− a
∗λ2s (.) s0 (.)
[λs (.)− a∗]3 = 0 (14)
Thus, ρ¯ that solves the central banks problem will be the processing fee such
that (1−λ−δ)
2
= a
∗λ2s(.)
[λs(.)−a∗]3 . With the solution for the processing fee, the central bank
chooses the money growth rate that satisÞes the seigniorage target. Because of
the governments budget constraint, as long as transfers are greater than zero, the
money stock will grow. In short, θ > 1 will hold for a∗ > 0. Wallace (1981),
and others, have shown that θ = 1 is the welfare maximizing rate of money growth
for the perfect-foresight versions of this economy. As long as a∗ is consistent withR
θt+1g(θt+1|Ωt)dθ = 1, there is no inherent inßation bias, even in this game in which
secrecy is present.
This is a model of central-bank secrecy. The central bank knows what future
money growth will and agents do not. Indeed, here secrecy is active in the sense
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that the central bank takes actions-sets the processing feeso that agents will not
consume all the messages. The agent must choose how intensely to fed watch, thus
translating messages into particular distribution of future money growth rates. As
such, it seems natural to interpret the processing fee as an indicator the quality of
the central banks messages. In other words, the more obtuse the central bank is
in its communications with agents, the higher the processing fee; that is, the more
goods the agent must expend to convert a given message into a transformation of the
distribution function.
From this setup, one can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The central bank chooses a level of secrecy, ρ ≥ 0. Note that the level
of secrecy is positively related to the size of the seigniorage target and inversely related
to the bond-saving ratio.
Proof: Equation (14) indicates the impact that changes in the seigniorage target
and the bond-money ratio have on the central banks choice of secrecy. The central
banks choice of ρ will satisfy the condition
(1− λ− δ)
2
=
a∗λ2s (.)
[λs (.)− a∗]3 (15)
Diﬀerentiate with respect to the bond-deposit ratio (δ) of the seigniorage target
(a∗), and after some algebra, will permit one to verify the qualitative statements
made in Proposition 3.¥
I consider the eﬀects that changes in the parameters would have on central-bank
secrecy. For instance, suppose there is an increase in the target level of seigniorage.
Diﬀerentiate the right-hand side of equation (15) with respect a∗. It is straightforward
to show that the right-hand-side of equation (15) is positively related to changes in
a∗. Thus, the central bank will choose to be more secretive-charge a higher price for
messageswhen the seigniorage target increases. The central bank faces a tradeoﬀ.
With a higher seigniorage target, it can raise more seigniorage by inducing more
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saving. Hence, the incentive to raise the price of messages. However, the potential
cost is that with greater saving, the deviation from the target capital stock increases
if the level of saving is already above the target level. Because the central banks
problem is convex in the money growth rate and linear in the deviation from the
target growth rate, we see that the central bank chooses a higher price of messages
when the seigniorage target increases.
Consider an increase in, δ, the bond-deposit ratio. This would be similar to a
permanent open-market sale of government bonds. For this case, the central bank
raises the price of messages. Here, the intuition is that the increase in the bond-
deposit ratio crowds some capital. To come closer to its target capital stock, the
central bank wishes to induce more saving. A by-product is that the seigniorage tax
base rises, lowering the money growth rate necessary to hits its seigniorage target.
Thus, the central bank chooses to be more secretive when there a permanent open
market sale.
Suppose agents were to intensify their fed watching. What aﬀect would this have
on the central banks choice of secrecy; that is, the price of messages? Consider a
preference shock such that agent chooses more messages for a given price of messages.
Further, suppose that increased fed watching crowds out saving. Based on equation
(13), a decrease in s (ρ) reduces the central banks level of utility. From the central
banks perspective, a decline in agents saving has two eﬀects. First, it means that it
is more diﬃcult to hit the central banks capital stock target. Second, a reduction in
saving reduces the seigniorage tax base. The implication is that the central bank will
have to increase the money growth rate in order to hit its seigniorage target. Because
faster money is costly to the central bank, the central bank is worse oﬀ when agents
increase their level of fed watching. This exercise holds the level of secrecythe price
of messagesconstant.
Next, consider the eﬀect increased fed watching would have on the central banks
pricing decision. From equation (14), a decrease in saving induces the central bank
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to raise the price of message. In short, more intense fed watching, for instance,
is associated with a more secretive central bank. The intuition is straightforward.
The central bank needs to raise the price of messages, inducing agents to save more.
With more saving, the central bank can hit its target capital stock and the amount
of inßation necessary to hit its seigniorage target declines with the higher message
price. Thus, the central bank responds to more intense fed watching by being more
secretive. Alternatively, the central bank is more open (less secretive) when an agent
chooses a smaller quantity of fed watching.
6 A benevolent government
In this section, I introduce another source of uncertainty. The question is, Would a
benevolent governmentone that seeks to maximize the welfare of its citizensprefer a
positive processing fee to the outcome in which there is perfect foresight. In contrast
to the previous setup, a positive processing fee is not the outcome of some noncoop-
erative play between the government and agents. If the answer to the sections key
question is yes, the benevolent governments policy is observationally equivalent to
secrecy. However, the motive is to maximize the agents welfare not part of some
noncooperative play.
In this model economy, I make two simplifying assumptions and add one stochastic
feature. First, I assume that the return to capital is independent of the quantity of
the capital stock. Second, I eliminate government bonds. Hence, the government
faces one budget constraint, depicted as follows
at = vt (mt −mt−1) (16)
Equation (16) indicates that the government introduces new money via a lump-
sum transfer to old agents. In addition, I include another layer of uncertainty;
speciÞcally, the real return to capital can take on either of two values. Formally, let
x ∈ ©xh, xlª, where Pr ob ¡x = xh¢ = α and Pr ob ¡x = xl¢ = 1− α. Realizations of
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the return to capital are identically and independently distributed across time. The
real return to capital accumulated at date t − 1 is learned at the start of date t.
Thus, neither the central bank nor agents, know the random return at the time each
has to makes its decision. Following the realization of the random return to capital,
the central bank announces the date-t money growth rate as drawn from the date
t − 1 equilibrium probability distribution function.19 Following the central banks
money growth announcement, it chooses the processing fee for date-t messages, old
agents receive the product of rs, and young agents make their consumption, saving,
and fed-watching decision.
By adding uncertain returns to capital, the government might conduct monetary
policy to eﬃciently pool the agents risk. To focus on the governments problem, I
limit attention to alternative decisions. In one decision, the central bank sets the
processing fee equal to zero. Obviously, the agent will consume all the messages and
the distribution of future money growth degenerates into the case in which future
money growth rates are known with certainty. In the second decision, the central
bank sets a positive processing fee in order to give it the ßexibility to pool return
risks.
Consider both cases in a stationary setting. Note that a = λs
¡
1− 1
θ¯
¢
. Let sm
denote the level of savings that a representative young person would choose when the
money growth rate is known; that is, the processing fee is zero. Thus, the government
seeks to maximize the (trivially expected) lifetime utility of the representative young
person. I substitute for a using the government budget constraint,. After collecting
terms and reducing the expression for second-period consumption, the agents lifetime
utility level is
U (y − sm) + αV ©£(1− λ)xh + λ¤ smª+ (1− α)V ©£(1− λ) xl + λ¤ smª (17)
19More precisely, let Ω∗ denote the equilibrium quantity of messages acquired by young agents at
date t− 1. In equilibrium, the date t− 1 conditional probability density function is g (θt|Ω∗).
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Note that future money growth is absent from the expression for expected second-
period utility. Equation (17) indicates only one source of uncertainty, the real return
to capital. After the lump-sum transfer is taken into account, the inßation tax
and the lump-sum transfer cancel each other out. Hence, the return to savings is
independent of the rate of money growth. What is left is the wedge between the
return to capital and the return to money, which appears as the coeﬃcient on savings
in equation (17).
Alternatively, consider a case in which the government pools interest rate risk. In
eﬀect, the policy is equivalent to targeting the interest rate on savings. In practice,
this means that whenever the high real return to capital was realized, the central
bank would select faster money growth. Conversely, when the low return was
realized, the money growth rate was lower. Overall, the return to savings is constant
across the two realizations; that is, (1− λ) xh + λ
θh
= (1− λ)xl + λ
θl
, where θi for
i = h, l denotes the money growth rates for the high and low states, respectively.
The question is, Would interest-rate targeting result in higher utility than a con-
stant money supply growth rule. Interest-rate targeting means that future money
growth is not a degenerate distribution. In other words, α% of the time θ = θh while
θ = θl during the remaining 1− α% of the time. As the reader will see shortly, pin-
ning down the gross real return to savings does not imply that uncertainty is absent
from the agents second-period budget constraint.
In the interest-rate targeting case, the process fee must be greater than zero.
The argument is a proof by contradiction. Suppose that the processing fee were
equal to zero. The agent would process all the messages and the characterization
of the future money growth rate is a degenerate distribution function. Yet, in
the interest-rate targeting case, future money growth rate is not characterized by a
degenerate distribution. Rather, future money growth is characterized by a discrete,
nondegenerate distribution function. Thus, with the processing fee set equal to
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zero, there is no rational-expectations equilibrium; the objective distribution function
characterizing the money growth rate is not identical to the conditional, degenerate
distribution function used by the agent. It follows that the processing fee must be
greater than zero in the interest-rate targeting case.
G (θt+1) =
 θ
h, if x = xh
θl, if x = xl
(18)
I Þx the gross real return to saving. Let r¯ = (1− α) xh + α
θh
= (1− α) xl + α
θl
,
where θh > θl. In words, the central bank chooses a faster money growth rate
θt+1 = θ
hwhen the gross return to capital is in the high state and slower money
growthθt+1 = θ
l when the gross return to capital is in the low state. Of course,
the governments seigniorage, and old-age transfers, will depend on the realization
of the gross return to capital. In the high real return state, ah = λs (ρ)
¡
1− 1
θh
¢
whereas in the low real return state, al = λs (ρ)
¡
1− 1
θl
¢
. Taking the agents savings
as given, θh > θl implies that ah > al.
For young agents, the future money growth rate is stochastic. Let there exist a
ρi > 0 such that G (θt+1|Ω (ρi)) = G (θt+1). Taking the processing fee as given, the
conditional distribution of money growth rate is identical to the unconditional objec-
tive distribution of future money growth. Thus, the rational expectations condition
is taken into account by the benevolent government.20
Now, it is possible to characterize lifetime welfare for the agent in the interest-rate
smoothing case. Let si denote the level of saving in the interest-rate smoothing case.
In short, si = s (ρi).
U
¡
y − s ¡ρi¢− ρiΩ ¡ρi¢¢ (19)
+αV
©£
(1− λ) xh + λ¤ si ¡ρi¢ª+ (1− α)V ©£(1− λ)xl + λ¤ si ¡ρi¢ª
20What if there could be multiple values of ρ that satisfy this rational expectations condition? I
assume that the central bank, interested in the agents welfare, chooses the smallest value.
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A comparison of equations (17) and (19) indicates that for any ρ > 0 expected
lifetime utility is higher in the constant money growth setting than in the interest-
rate smoothing setting. Note that money growth does not enter into the expression
for expected lifetime utility. Whatever gains are garnered by interest-rate targeting
are cancelled by a lump-sum transfer, leaving a stochastic return to capital. In
this setup, old-age transfers are also state-contingent, exactly oﬀsetting the revenues
from the inßation tax so that money growth does not eﬀectively smooth interest-rate
ßuctuations.
Another way to see is to compare equations (17) and (19). Note that these
two expressions are identical if ρ = 0. With ρ > 0, fed watching amounts to
throwing away goods that could be consumed without beneÞtting from the reduced
uncertainty.
6.1 Government purchases
The inßation tax-transfer scheme plays an important role in the comparison between
the money-growth and interest-rate targeting cases. It seems natural to ask, How
do things change, if at all, if seigniorage is used to Þnance government spending
rather than old-age transfer payments? More speciÞcally, what if the inßation tax
revenues are kept by the government rather than rebated back to agents as a lump-
sum payment?
In this model economy, let the government budget constraint be represented by
g = λs (ρ)
¡
1− 1
θ
¢
. Here, the central bank uses newly printed money to acquire
goods from old agents, and throws the goods into the ocean. Hence, the government
purchases do not provide any direct utility to agents. This setup is equivalent to
a setup in which the government must buy goods that are imperfect substitutes
for private consumption. As such, I continue to refer to the government here as
benevolent, despite the fact that there is a welfare is reduced because of the some
goods are not consumed privately. The resulting second-period budget constraint
30
is characterized by the expression c2 = rs (ρ)− g.21
I consider the constant-money growth and interest-rate targeting experiments with
positive levels of government purchases. In the constant money growth case, seignior-
age is known and Þxedequal to λs
¡
1− 1
θ¯
¢
. There only uncertainty, therefore, comes
from the uncertain real return to capital. Thus, lifetime expected utility is
U (y − s) + αV
·
(1− λ)xhs+ λ
θ¯
s− g
¸
+ (1− α)V
·
(1− λ) xls+ λ
θ¯
s− g
¸
(20)
Alternatively, in the interest-rate targeting case, government purchases are state
contingent because seigniorage depends on the realized value of money growth. Ex-
pected lifetime utility is represented as
U (y − s (ρ)− ρΩ (ρ)) + αV £r¯s− gh¤+ (1− α)V £r¯s− gl¤ (21)
Use the government budget constraint to substitute for g in equation (20) and for
gh and gl in equation (21). We can write expected lifetime utility in the constant
money growth case as
U (y − s) + αV
½·
(1− λ)xh + 2λ
θ¯
− λ
¸
s
¾
+ (1− α)V
½·
(1− λ) xl + 2λ
θ¯
− λ
¸
s
¾
and for the interest-rate targeting case as
U (y − s (ρ)− ρΩ (ρ)) +
αV
½·
(1− λ)xh + 2λ
θh
− λ
¸
s (ρ)
¾
+ (1− α)V
½·
(1− λ) xl + 2λ
θl
− λ
¸
s (ρ)
¾
The next step is to ask, What are the conditions, if any, in which expected lifetime
is greater in the interest-rate targeting case than in the constant money growth rate
cases?
Assumption (A3): I assume that there exists ρ such that U (y − sm)−U (y − si (ρ)− ρΩ (ρ)) <
ε, where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily close to zero.
21I adopt this speciÞcation to maintain the isolation between the Þrst- and second-period budget
constraints. More speciÞcally, the agent only faces uncertainty in the second-period of life.
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Here, Assumption A3 permits me to focus on the second-period utility under
the constant-money growth and interest-rate targeting cases. As long as the ρ in
Assumption A3 is consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium, and long as
expected utility is greater in the interest-rate targeting regime, then there is a positive
processing fee that the agent is willing to pay to get interest-rate targeting. I proceed
with a comparison of expected second-period utility. Formally,
αV (r1s (ρ)) + (1− α)V (r2s (ρ)) > αV (r3s) + (1− α)V (r4s) (22)
where
r1 ≡ (1− λ) xh + 2λ
θh
− λ
r2 ≡ (1− λ) xl + 2λ
θl
− λ
r3 ≡ (1− λ) xh + 2λ
θ¯
− λ
r4 ≡ (1− λ) xl + 2λ
θ¯
− λ
Suppose θh > θ¯ > θl. It follows that r1 < r3 and r4 < r2. From this characteri-
zation, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose g, gh, gl > 0. With Assumption (A3) and a given posi-
tive processing fee, future generations’ expected lifetime welfare is higher under the
interest-rate targeting regime than under the constant money growth regime if the ex-
pected real return to fiat money in the interest-rate targeting case is less than the real
return to money in constant money growth case.
Proof. To compare expected utility, we apply stochastic dominance results. Con-
dition (22) holds if the distribution of returns in the interest rate targeting case
second-order stochastic dominates the distribution of returns for the constant-money
growth case. Formally, αr1+(1− α) r2 < αr3+(1− α) r4. Expand this expression,
using the deÞnitions of ri for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. The resulting expression reduces to
(1− α)
µ
1
θl
− 1
θ¯
¶
< α
µ
1
θ¯
− 1
θh
¶
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After rearranging, one gets
(1− α) 1
θl
+ α
1
θh
<
1
θ¯
where the terms on the left-hand side of the inequality is the expected real return to
money in the interest-rate smoothing case and the term on the right-hand side is the
real return to money when the money growth rate is constant.
Proposition 4 says that a benevolent government would choose a positive process-
ing fee over committing to a constant money growth rate provided the expected real
return to saving. In other words, agents would prefer a lower return with certainty
combined with smaller expected g, to a case in which expected real returns are higher
and government purchases are known.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. With interest-rate tar-
geting, the central bank permits the real return to money to vary depending on the
realized state of returns to capital, targeting the real return to saving. If the expected
real return to Þat money is less than the real return to Þat money in the constant-
money growth setting, the distribution of total resources stochastically dominates the
distribution associated with the constant-money growth case. Thus, provided the loss
of Þrst-period utility to buying the central banks messages is small enough, expected
lifetime utility is greater under the distribution that stochastically dominates. A
benevolent government would prefer to be obtusea positive processing feethan to
let ρ = 0.
The interest-rate targeting regime is a state-contingent rule. Proposition 4 iden-
tiÞes the conditions in which a state-contingent rule is can be preferred to a noncon-
tingent rule. Indeed, Proposition 4 says that under these conditions, the agent is
willing to pay some price to follow the state-contingent rule. In this interpretation,
with lump-sum transfer payments, the agent is no worse oﬀ in the state-contingent
setting if ρ = 0. Agents are simply not willing to pay a positive processing fee to get
the state-contingent rule when government purchases are in the form of lump-sum
transfer payments.
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There is some positive value of the processing fee that an agent is willing to pay in
order to target the return to saving. Note, however, that the interest-rate targeting
does not mean that the second-period income is certain. The level of government
purchases is state contingent. With ρ = 0, the central bank commits to particular
money growth setting, abandoning its ability to apply a rule that state-contingent
with respect to the real return to savings. When the returns to capital are uncertain,
the conditions in Proposition 4 indicate when the agent would be willing to pay a
positive price to target interest rates, at the risk of uncertain government purchases.
In eﬀect, Proposition 4 characterizes those conditions in which too much central-bank
transparency is harmful. Or, alternatively, opaqueness can lead to expected welfare
improvements.
The value of central-bank opaqueness comes from its ability to observe the mar-
ginal product of capital before setting the money growth rate. In other words,
the central bank can eﬃciently pool risk and guarantee a Þxed return to savings by
waiting.22 Even though government expenditures are uncertain in the interest-rate
targeting case, as long as the expected level of government purchases are smaller than
they would be in the constant-money growth setting, the agent could be better oﬀ in
terms of expected lifetime utility. Here, opaqueness is not necessarily a signal of the
central banks malicious intention, or reßective of an adversarial position. Indeed,
the results in this last section are derived in the context of a benevolent central bank.
Both central bank and the agent face an uncertainty. By targeting interest rates, the
central bank is ßexible to act when it realizes the random state variable. The alterna-
tive is to precommit to particular money growth rule, foregoing the state-contingent
rule.
In this model economy, the central bank observes the return to capital before it sets
the money growth rate. This assumption greatly simpliÞes the identiÞcation problem
22After taking government purchases into account, the coeﬃcient on savings is state contingent.
Here interest-rate targeting refers to the rates at which an agent converts Þrst-period consumption
good into second-period consumption good, abstracting from the eﬀects of government purchases.
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faced by a central bank. Making the central banks signal-extraction problem more
substantial, however, does not necessarily overturn the results. For instance, suppose
that at date t+1, the central bank observes a distribution of returns to capital instead
of the particular real return to capital. As long as the central banks distribution
yields an improvement, on average, over a Þxed-money growth rate strategy, expected
welfare will be higher. The value of opaqueness comes from the central banks
information set available at date t + 1 compared with the information set available
at date t; that is, the central bank can wait, rather than precommit. In short, what
matters is that the central bank picks the money growth rate that, on average,
It should be clear from the description of the model economy that the absence
of central-bank transparency is not equivalent to central-bank secrecy. At the time
that messages are acquired by agents, the central bank does not know anything more
about the return to capital than agents do. However, with interest-rate targeting, the
agents information set at date twhen the consumption-saving decision is madeis a
proper subset of the central banks information at the timedate t+1that the central
bank must choose its money growth rate. As such, Proposition 4 characterizes an
opaque central bank, not a secretive one and it identiÞes the conditions in which
such opaqueness is valuable to the agent. I have only looked at a comparison in
which the central bank eﬃciently pools interest-rate risk. In this model economy,
only interest-rate risks are present. Other state-contingent rules would apply as the
central bank observes other kinds of risk.
Note that interest-rate targeting implies that government purchases are procycli-
cal. When capitals return is high, money growth is faster and government purchases
are higher. Compared with the level of government purchases in the constant money
growth regime, Proposition 4 implies that government purchases are, on average,
lower in the interest-rate targeting regime.
Thus, I have shown that a benevolent government will choose to be opaque. It is
interesting that opaqueness is the means to eﬃciently pooling interest-rate risk in this
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model economy. More concretely, eﬃcient risk pooling is consistent with interest
rate targeting, smaller government, on average, and procyclical government revenues
as distinguishing characteristics compared with the regime in which transparency
depicts central bank behavior.
7 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, I use a simple general equilibrium model to examine the role of fed
watching in two settings. In this setup, fed watching is the act of processing central
bank messages. Though the messages can be acquired for free, the value of the
message comes from studying them and drawing inference about the central banks
future actions. I model such private activities as a processing fee that is paid for
with units of the consumption good. More speciÞcally, I consider a processing fee as
the rate at which goods are expended to transform a message into a change in the
distribution of future money growth rates. Messages are standardized so that the
processing fee is constant per message. As such, fed watching can be thought of as
agents choice over alternative distribution functions. The Þrst part of the paper is
devoted to deriving conditions in which a private agent will pay a positive price to
process the central banks messages.
The second part of the paper seeks to account for why a central bank would be
opaque. I begin with a case in which the central banks objective function diﬀers
from the agents objective function. In equilibrium, the central bank knows what
its future money growth rate will be and sets the processing fee to keep agents from
consuming all of the messages. Insofar as the agent does not process all of the
messages, the central bank is being secretive. I can show an interesting corollary in
this setting; that is, the equilibrium level of secrecy is greater when governments rely
more heavily on the central bank for seigniorage. There is certainly an impression
that central banks in undeveloped countries are more opaque than those in more
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developed countries. Insofar as undeveloped countries also may rely more heavily on
the inßation tax as a revenue source, this corollary could account for less transparency
in undeveloped countries.
Suppose that the central bank wishes to maximize the objective function of a
private agent. I derive the conditions in which the central bank would set a positive
processing fee for its messages in this case. Though the two settings yields qualita-
tively similar outcomes in terms of a positive processing fee, it is diﬃcult to interpret
the government as being secretive. In this setting, there is no private information,
the central bank is opaque with respect to its future actions. Here, opaqueness gives
the central bank leeway to follow the state-contingent rule that raises the representa-
tive agents welfare. In other words, the central bank oﬀers less-than-clear messages,
requiring people to exert eﬀort to interpret their meaning, in order to execute the
best wait-and-see policy it can.
Both secrecy and opaqueness share one fundamental attribute. Namely, the agent
does not process all the central banks messages, so that the central banks future
actions are not fully revealed. It is simply too expensive for the agent to expend
enough resources to yield a transparent central bank. In the setting with secrecy,
the central bank is acting noncooperatively, perhaps maximizing social welfare. In
contrast, opaqueness is a welfare-improving outcomethe central bank is opaque in
order to apply the eﬃcient state-contingent rule.
Though interest-rate targeting versus money-growth targeting is not the central
theme of this paper, the results oﬀer a theoretical explanation for why interest-rate
targeting is preferred to a money-growth rule. Poole (1970) demonstrated the con-
ditions in which an interest-rate target would reduce output variability. Both Carl-
strom and Fuerst (1995) and Rebelo and Xie (1999) show that interest-rate targeting
is eﬃcient. Carlstrom and Fuerst argue that the interest-rate peg reduces distor-
tions in an economy subject to both productivity shocks and government spending
shocks. Rebelo and Xie demonstrate that the interest-rate target yields Pareto-
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eﬃcient allocations in a continuous-time monetary growth model. Following both of
these papers, I use welfare criterion to assess the desirability of interest-rate targeting
versus money-growth targeting. Carlstrom and Fuerst look at an economy in which
monetary policy distorts both the consumption-saving decision and the labor-leisure
decision. Because the theorem of the second-best applies, they use numerical analy-
ses to compare welfare under the interest-rate peg and the money-growth peg. In
this paper, there is not labor-leisure tradeoﬀ. However, the suﬃciency conditions
derived here apply in the second-best setting. As such, this paper goes part way
toward assessing the eﬃciency issues raised by Carlstrom and Fuerst.
Several extensions come to mind. One is to investigate the transition dynamics.
Throughout this paper, I focus on stationary settings. It is natural to wonder what
is the appropriate course along the transition path. Along the transition path, it
may be possible to talk about reputation-building and credibility. In other words,
perhaps there are instances in which the central bank produces bad messages. Such
concepts do not lend themselves to static exercise such as those developed here. In
addition, the representative agent is quite tractable, but fails to consider the role of
heterogeneity among agents. With heterogeneous agents, one could investigate the
role, if any, coming from agents with diﬀerent choices of fed watching.
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